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This article introduces the concept of ‘household governance’ and investigates empirical
differences in governance practices among Dutch households. It stresses informal
household rules and conflict-handling strategies of cohabiting couples as important
means to govern daily time allocation. The leading question is to what extent the concept
of household governance contributes to our understanding of the way households
combine the demands from paid and unpaid work. Empirical analyses based on a
sample of 809 Dutch cohabiting employees and their spouses (Time Competition Survey
2003) show considerable differences in the use of household rules and conflict-handling
strategies among households. A linear regression analysis confirms that the demand to
govern daily time allocation by means of household rules and conflict-handling strategies
is influenced by the earner type of the household, household characteristics (e.g. the
presence of children) and job demands (e.g. frequent requests for working overtime). In
this context, the interaction of household demands and job demands plays a major role
for the type of household governance that is used in the household. Moreover, we found
characteristic differences in conflict handling between men and women.
41. Introduction1
In the Netherlands, considerable debate has arisen, to what extent and why employees
are working more hours than they would actually prefer to do. Recent studies on time
use of Dutch employees document increasing hours for both, paid and domestic work
(SCP, 1999: 208) and a growing perception of feeling rushed or crunched for time
(Breedveld, 2001). In a large number of households one or even both spouses are not
satisfied with their factual amount of working hours and the division of labor in the
household. Women would usually prefer to work more hours, while men are interested to
reduce their working hours (SCP, 2000: 15; Plantenga, Schippers & Siegers, 1999: 109).
Given these results, the question raises why so many households fail to realize their
time preferences.
Available accounts on the combination of paid and unpaid work in the household
are either emphasizing differences in comparative advantages between spouses (like
earning potential or domestic skills), stress the importance of norms or role expectations
in and outside the household, or focus on institutional restrictions for the working hour
transitions of spouses (e.g. labor market policy). Social control in the household has
hardly been taken into account yet. This article wants to make a step towards closing
this gap in existing research by developing and testing a theory of ‘household
governance’. We will do so by first introducing the concept of household governance and
its theoretical background. Subsequently, we will investigate to what extent this new
approach is able to contribute to our understanding of time allocation and the resolution
of time conflicts in the household.
The core idea behind the concept of household governance2 is that interdependent
actors will ‘govern’ their ongoing transactions in two ways. First, they will use
agreements concerning desired household activities. Second, in order to reinforce these
agreements and to avoid open conflict, household members will engage in conflict-
handling strategies (see Pollak, 1985). While the concepts of governance and
negotiation are quite common in organizational research and institutional approaches
towards labor supply, they have not yet entered research on household time allocation.
When we accept that institutional arrangements (e.g. labor market regulations) and
governance structures at the work place (e.g. management strategies) are influencing
the work performance of employees, it is hard to understand for what reason we should
neglect the impacts of governance practices in the household sphere. This does not only
                                                          
1 Thanks to Rafael Wittek and Arie Glebbeek (University of Groningen), Jacques Siegers
(Utrecht University), Eckart Hildebrandt and Karin Schulze-Buschoff (Social Science
Research Center Berlin) for their suggestions and support.
2 Within the growing debate on ‘governance’ with its various accents and definitions, the
term ‘household governance’ is rather used in the tradition of transaction cost theory
(Williamson, 1985). Inspired by the work of Pollak (1985) it acknowledges that
households (just like firms) face risks in exchange relations and aim to reduce transaction
costs by efficient forms of governance.
5draw the attention to direct effects of household governance but also on the interaction
of governance practices in the household with governance practices of the work place(s)
of the partners.
In this article we approach the household as an institution of informal social control
that governs the daily time allocation of spouses by household rules and conflict-
handling strategies. Based on standardized interviews with 809 cohabiting employees
and their partners differences in household governance are investigated. The article
addresses two questions:
1. Why is it useful for our understanding of how people combine paid and unpaid
work to take into account governance practices in the household?
2. In which way do Dutch households differ in these governance practices and how
are these differences related to personal, household, and job characteristics of
the spouses?
2. ‘Household governance’: a gap in existing accounts on time allocation
Three major research disciplines focus on household time allocation: Household
economics, sociological research on work-family balance, and institutional approaches
towards labor market regulations.
Economic approaches explain between-household variations in time allocation by
differences in the comparative advantage each spouse may have on the labor market
(earning potential) and within the household (domestic skills) (Hallberg, 2001). Central to
this economic approach is the idea, that differences in the relative prices of time, mainly
determined by the earning potential of the spouses, are a basic determinant of
household time allocation (see Van Dijk & Siegers, 1996). An increasing number of
studies is also paying attention to additional restrictions like the institutional or social
environment of the household and influences of the tax system (Kooreman & Wunderink,
1997; Grift, 1998). Finally, bargaining models have been introduced to the field. They
make it possible to take into account conflicting utility functions of spouses by referring to
differences in bargaining power and decision-making rules (Beblo, 2001).
Sociological accounts either focus on the impact of organizational arrangements
at the work places of the household partners, or they emphasize the influence of norms
and values in and outside the households. The first perspective assumes that incentive
schemes and informal peer control at the work place push employees to spend more
time on paid work (Clarkberg & Moen, 2001: 1119). In the second view, household time
allocation is restricted by gender specific norms and role expectations that are learned
during childhood socialization and controlled by sanctions of the social environment (Van
der Lippe & Siegers, 1994: 110; Juergens, 2001).
Policy oriented approaches towards labor supply and household activities focus on
restrictions on various institutional levels that influence (support or restrict) transitions
between different employment states. The analytical concept of ‘transitional labor
markets’ (Schmid, 2002) emphasizes the importance of different institutional regulations
6for the ‘entry into employment, mobility between jobs, and life-course management of
employment, including the combination of paid work in the formal labor market with other
socially useful activities, such as education and caring’ (Visser, 2003: 124). In this view,
institutionalized ‘working-time arrangements’ on the national or the company level, in
terms of a given working week, possibilities of (qualified) part-time work, work accounts,
(parental) leaves, variable working hours, overtime, or ‘unsocial’ hours play a major role
for labor market transitions, particularly with regard to gender differences in labor supply
or in a life-course perspective (Schmid, 2002; 296; O’Reilly, 2003; see for the
Netherlands Visser, 2003).
Yet, governance practices in the household are for a large part neglected by all these
disciplines. As a consequence, it remains unclear how spouses organize and coordinate
the daily distribution of various activities with each other and how they handle situations
in which agreements with the partner are in conflict with the demands of paid work.
Basically, there are three reasons to pay more attention to these forms of daily
governance in the household.
1. The huge growth in female labor market participation and a more flexible
organization of labor have complicated the division of work in the household
(Frederiksen-Goldsen & Scharlach, 2001: 254). Contrary to the rather simple division
of work in traditional breadwinner households, modern households often became
places where two working spouses have to divide various domestic tasks among
each other and to integrate them with demands from two jobs (Gill, 1998: 5). As a
consequence, the particular ways and means of spouses to distribute and coordinate
tasks with each other and to deal with situations of interpersonal work-household
conflict became more important for a successful organization of the household. This
holds particularly for forms of work organizations that are prone to blur the
boundaries between paid work and domestic activities – i.e. when the firm requires a
workforce that is highly ‘flexible’ in terms of around-the-clock availability and overtime
work.
2. A number of recent, mainly qualitative, studies brought to light characteristic
differences in daily household decision making, in terms of typical ‘interaction orders’
(Gill, 1998), ‘allocation rules’ (van der Vinne, 1998), ‘conduct of everyday life’
(Juergens, 2000), or ‘boundary control’ (Perlow, 1998). A German study, for
instance, coined the term ‘conduct of everyday life’ to describe the distinct ways how
household members to arrange the practical tasks of their daily life (Projektgruppe
‘Alltägliche Lebensführung’, 1995). Three different types of ‘conduct of everyday life’
are distinguished: A ‘traditional’ type (‘everyday routine’) builds mainly on routines
and habits as means to combine work and family life. A ‘strategic’ type (‘everyday
organization’) is characterized by rational organizing and long-term planning of daily
activities. Finally, a ‘flexible’ type of conduct of everyday life (‘everyday art’) is based
on flexible arrangements and short-term decisions (see also Jürgens 2000; Eberling,
Hielscher, Hildebrandt & Jürgens, 2004).
73. Some of these previous studies also show that differences in daily household
decision making affect household time allocation, independently from household or
work characteristics. The (Australian) study by Gill (1998), points out that different
‘management rules’ or ‘interaction orders’ in the household prove to be decisive for
the success of the spouses to combine work and family life. The study concludes
that competing work and household demands can be managed in a more efficient
way, when goals, roles and rules for household time allocation are handled in a
flexible way (Gill, 1998: 195). The (American) study by Perlow (1998) investigated
differences in household ‘boundary control’. In addition to control strategies of the
firm (management), competing control attempts of employees and their spouses are
taken into account in terms of ‘acceptance’ and ‘resistance’ towards the firm’s control
strategies. Perlow’s study shows that the number of working hours is lower in
households where the spouse makes strong efforts to maintain boundary control by
resisting the firm’s claim on his or her partner’s free time (Perlow, 1998: 353).
These findings also highlight the central theoretical argument of this article: households
are places of informal social control. Spouses make agreements with each other about
the distribution and coordination of paid and unpaid work and they use strategies in
order to reinforce these agreements in situations of conflict.
The importance of ‘governance structures’ for the work performance of
employees has been considered in organizational research (see Williamson, 1985). But
despite some rather sporadic attempts to apply this idea to the household sphere (see
Pollack, 1995) structures and processes of governance in the household have not yet
entered existing accounts on the division of paid and unpaid work in the household. If we
think of households as places of shared production, where two spouses need to
cooperate in order to share a life together and to cope with the demands of paid and
unpaid work, the threat of unfavorable behavior or unfavorable influences from the
household environment (like the work sphere) is always around. Just like organizations,
spouses can use social control in order to prevent such unfavorable influences, to
guarantee sufficient time for unpaid work or joint activities, and to avoid open conflicts.
In the following section, we will focus on two different types of governance
practices in the household: informal household rules on the one hand and strategies to
handle situations of work-household conflict on the other.
3. ‘Household governance’: the concept
The approach taken here starts with the assumption that spouses are in a situation of
shared production. They are interested to achieve desired goals (like joint activities with
each other, a career of one or both spouses, or having a family life) by cooperating with
each other. In order to guarantee the achievement of cooperation gains, spouses will
look for means to prevent unfavorable impacts from the household’s environment or
unfavorable behavior of the other spouse. There are at least two sources for such
8threats to successful joint production. First, spouses might have problems to arrange
and integrate the separated activities in an efficient way (coordination problem). Second,
they might have conflicting ideas about the desired ‘product’ itself and the time
investment that is required from each spouse (cooperation problem).
In order to avoid possible hazards to household production or their relationship,
household members can employ means to regulate their behavior on a daily basis. The
choice for a particular earner type (like the breadwinner model or dual earner ship) can
be interpreted as a fundamental agreement of spouses with regard to responsibilities
and priorities in the household which they impose on themselves (Moen & Sweet, 2003:
18). Given this basic arrangement, there remains a varying demand to govern the daily
distribution of tasks by informal rules about the division and coordination of tasks and by
strategies to avoid or handle interpersonal conflicts. We define household governance
as the combination of such rules and conflict-handling strategies.
Informal household rules
Informal rules (norms) are one possible solution to cooperation and coordination
problems between interdependent actors (see Thibaut & Kelly, 1959; Lindenberg, 1997).
In order to guarantee that there is sufficient time for unpaid work and joint activities,
spouses can make agreements about (a) the required time investment of each spouse,
(b) the quality of desired outcomes, and (c) the coordination of the various activities.
These three basic claims of household governance - quantity, quality, and coordination
of activities – can also be found in the sociological household studies mentioned earlier
(Gill, 1998; Jürgens, 2000; Perlow, 1998; Van der Vinne, 1998). Based on the findings of
these studies, we distinguish four different types of informal household rules.
1. Time claims: To what extent do informal household rules claim a high
investment into domestic activities from an actor?
2. Quality standards: To what extent do informal household rules claim high
quality standards for domestic activities from an actor?
3. Fixed responsibilities: To what extent do informal household rules fix
responsibilities for domestic activities for an actor?
4. Fixed times: To what extent do informal household rules claim fixed times for
the performance of domestic activities?
For want of space, this article focuses on only two of these four kinds of rules: time
claims and fixed times. Both rules aim to govern the boundaries and moments for paid
and unpaid work. The more a household makes use of such rules, the more it
establishes incentives for the daily time allocation of the spouses: We assume that
conforming to rules will be rewarded by the other spouse, while deviating from given
rules is likely to cause negative sanctions. As a consequence, employees who are
sharing rules with the partner will have an additional incentive to engage in domestic
9activities. When they work for pay they can easily come in a situation of competing
demands and loyalties between the work and the household sphere. Their behavior in
such a dilemma will not only depend on household rules but also on the strategies that
are used by the spouse in order to resist respectively support high employer demands.
Conflict-handling strategies
Even the best rules and agreements are not able to prevent any kind of conflict of
interest between spouses. Next to household rules, conflict-handling strategies therefore
form a second important element of household governance. Here, we focus on
strategies that are used in the household to handle time-based interpersonal work-
household conflict: How do the spouses handle situations of competing employer and
household demands?
A fruitful theoretical heuristic for modelling the use of conflict-handling strategies
is the ‘dual-concern model’ (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993: 104-107; Janssen & Van de Vliert,
1996:101-103). It assumes that the choice of a conflict-handling strategy is determined
by two types of motivations: the degree of self-concern and the degree of other concern.
An individual will score high on both dimensions in situations of high interdependence
with others, where both actors are interested in maintaining a functioning long-term
relationship.
The ‘dual-concern model’ distinguishes five major conflict-handling strategies
(Janssen & Van de Vliert, 1996: 101-102):
1. Accommodating: Reducing ones goal and giving in to the other party’s goal.
2. Compromising: Reducing ones goal when the other party is doing so, too.
3. Problem solving: Trying to find a solution that matches both parties’ goals.
4. Avoiding: Doing nothing (or as little as possible) to resolve the conflict.
5. Forcing: Trying to persuade the other party to reduce his or her goal.
Following the idea of household governance, we are first of all interested in strategies
that are used by spouses in order to resist high employer demands (overtime) that are
imposed on their employed partners. A spouse, who resists the wish of an employee to
comply to high employer demands (overtime), will at least complicate the goal
achievement of this employee and increase the likelihood that he or she does not invest
extra time into paid work. We assume that the spouses’ resistance is low when he or she
handles work-household conflict by ‘accommodating’ or ‘problem solving’. In both cases
the goal of the employee (working overtime) is not at question. Resistance will be
somewhat higher when the spouse uses ‘compromising’, since this conflict strategy
claims at least partly concessions from the employee (working less overtime). In our
opinion, resistance will be high when the spouse handles work-household conflict by
‘forcing’. In this case, the spouse is not willing to make any concessions and wants the
employee to give up (not working overtime). The role of ‘avoiding’ is hard to predict. It
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strongly depends on the conflict context. On the one hand, ‘avoiding’ can express
indifference of the spouse. In this case resistance would be rather low. On the other
hand, ‘avoiding’ can be a powerful strategy to repel attempts of the other party to change
the status quo (Kluwer, 1998). In this respect, ‘avoiding’ would complicate the goal
achievement of the employee (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).
Given the outlined concept of household governance, the question raises to what
extent and in which way households differ in the use of these governance practices. In
the following we will present data on the variation of informal household rules and
conflict-handling strategies in Dutch households.
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4. Differences in governance practices among Dutch households
In this section we will firstly present a brief overview on our dataset and variables (4.1)
and secondly give an impression of empirical variations in governance practices among
Dutch households (4.2). In the next section (5.) we will analyze how these variations are
related to key job and household characteristics.
4.1 Research design and operationalization
The analysis is based on a sample of 809 Dutch cohabiting employees and their
spouses (Time Competition Survey). The data were collected in 2002/3 by the integrated
research project ‘Time Competition’ carried out at the Universities of Utrecht and
Groningen. Employees have been selected via 30 Dutch companies. In this respect the
dataset is not representative for the Dutch population. The employees and their spouses
were interviewed (separately) at home. In total 468 male and 351 female employees
participated in our survey. The interviews were based on a standardized questionnaire.
They contain a vignette for work-household conflict and a pre-coded time-use diary for
one week.
Informal household rules
In the interviews, the employees and their spouses could indicate to what extent they are
using household rules, which claim time or fix specific moments for the performance of
domestic activities.
Time claims were measured by four items that were asked to the employee: ‘If
you think about the situation of your household, do you have agreements with your
partner…’ a) ‘not to work in the evening’, b) ‘not to work in the weekend’, c) ‘to be in time
for dinner’, d) ‘not to be away all evenings’. For each item the respondents could answer
with ‘yes’, ‘not really’, or ‘no’3.
Fixed times (routines) were measured by four items asked to the employee: ‘Are
you doing the following activities on fixed moments? For example, a particular day and
time for going to the supermarket?’ a) ‘shopping’, b) ‘cleaning’, c) ‘having dinner
together’, d) ‘spending time together or with the family’. The answer categories were
‘never’, ‘sometimes’, ‘regularly’, ‘often’, ‘always’4.
In order to get an idea to what extent these agreements are ‘respected’ by the
employee, we also take into account the frequency of rule deviation. Rule deviation was
measured by the following question that was asked to the partner: ‘How often does it
happen that your partner…’ a) ‘cancels an appointment you had together’, b) ‘comes
home too late for dinner’, c) ‘can not do the household tasks that were agreed’. The
answer categories were: ‘almost every day’, ‘one time or a few times per week’, ‘one
time or a few times per month’, ‘a few times per year or less’5.
                                                          
3 Cronbach’s alpha for the resulting scale is 0,70.
4 Cronbach’s alpha for the resulting scale is 0,62
5 These categories resulted into a rather weak scale with an Cronbach’s alpha of 0,50.
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Conflict-handling strategies
In order to investigate how spouses handle situations of work-household conflict we
used a scenario for work-household conflict. The employee and the spouse
independently from each other indicated their reactions on the following situation: ‘You
have a dinner appointment with your partner for the next week. But suddenly it turns out
that you have to work overtime on that evening. Your partner is very interested to have
this dinner together with you, but you would prefer to work. What would you do in such a
situation?’ We are quite aware of the fact that this particular conflict situation (‘time for
work’ versus ‘time for each other’) is not representative for all the various conflicts that
use to occur in households. A more exhaustive measurement of conflict handling would
have to work with a number of vignettes that would take into account additional conflict
issues like ‘time for children’ or ‘time for household tasks’. However, we assume that our
vignette brings to light characteristic differences in conflict handling among households.
Moreover, the vignette that was chosen by us stands for a rather moderate conflict
situation in which the reactions of the partners are less sensitive to socially desirable
answers (as it would be the case when it was about ‘time for children’) and where the
partners cannot easily escape the conflict by outsourcing of tasks.
The different answer categories were taken from Janssen’s and Van de Vliert’s
operationalization of conflict handling. The respondents indicated on a number of five-
point scales to what extent they would use each of the five conflict-handling strategies:
‘forcing’, ‘accommodating’, ‘problem solving’, ‘compromising’, and ‘avoiding’. Each
strategy was measured by four items (for the list of items see Janssen and van de Vliert,
1996). The result was a 20-point scale for each strategy. A score of 13 or higher
indicates that the respondent is using this strategy. Each of the five scales has a
Cronbach’s alpha of at least 0,70.
Furthermore we take into account the frequency of work-household conflicts in
the household. Therefore we asked the following question to the partner of the
employee. ‘How often do you have conflicts with your partner about the division of tasks
in the household?’ The answer categories were: ‘almost every day’, ‘one time or a few
times per week’, ‘one time or a few times per month’, ‘a few times per year or less’.
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4.2 Empirical variations in household rules and conflict-handling strategies
In this section we investigate empirical differences in the governance practices of
cohabiting couples. The question to be examined is: to what extent do the employees in
our sample show differences with regard to the degree of regulation of household
activities by informal household rules and the conflict behavior (resistance) of their
partner in situations of work-household conflict?
Variation in household rules
The fact that time routines are widespread among Dutch households (SCP, 2003: 140)
is also confirmed for our sample. Two out of three employees have fixed dinner times
with the partner or their family. Half of the employees in our sample report to have fixed
moments for spending time with the partner or family, or to have fixed shopping times.
Compared to these three activities, cleaning (the house) is less often performed on fixed
times. Only a quarter of the employees has fixed moments for cleaning.
Table 1: Households with fixed times (routines) for different activities (in %)
‘Often or always doing things on fixed times (time routines)…’
having dinner together (with partner or family) 65




A considerable number of households in our sample combine several of the four time
routines. 30% of the employees have fixed times for at least three of the four mentioned
activities, another 29% have fixed times for two of the four mentioned activities. Only
17% are not using any of the four time routines.
Agreements with the spouse to have sufficient time for domestic activities (time claims)
are less common in our sample. One out of three employees has a clear agreement with
the spouse to be in time for dinner or not to be away all evenings. Only a minority of the
employees reports to have agreements not to work on weekends or on evenings.
Table 2: Households having clear agreements for different activities (in%)
‘Having a clear agreement with the partner…’
to be in time for dinner 37
not to be away all evenings 33
not to work in the weekend 10
not to work in the evening 8
(n=809)
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Almost 50% of the households do not have any of the four mentioned agreements. More
than a quarter reports to use only one of them, while only a minority has two (16%) or
even three (8%) of the mentioned four agreements.
One third of the partners in our sample report to have at least once a month a discussion
with the employee about the division of tasks in the household. The same number
reports that the employee is once a month (or even more frequent) not doing the
domestic tasks that were agreed. In almost 30% of the households the employee is at
least once a month coming too late or not coming at all for dinner. Only a minority of the
spouses reports that the employee is regularly calling off appointments or not able to
look after the children.
Table 3: Households where the employee is deviating from agreements (in %)
‘At least once a month…’
not doing the household tasks that were agreed 34
coming too late (or not at all) for dinner 29
calling off an appointment with the spouse 10
(n=809)
not able to take care of the children 14
(n=464) only employees with children (living at home)
The combination of the first three items gives us an idea of the total size of rule deviation
in the investigated households. It turns out that in the majority of the households (52%)
agreements are for the most part respected by the employee, while in more than 20% of
the households two out of three agreements are regularly violated by the employee.
Variations in conflict-handling strategies
In our scenario for work-household conflict, where the employee intends to work
overtime, while the partner wants him or her to stick to a joint dinner appointment, the
majority of the spouses are willing to accept the wish of the employee. The two most
cooperative conflict handling strategies (low resistance) – ‘accommodating’ and ‘problem
solving’ – are chosen by 41% and 71% of the partners. Since the partner can combine
different strategies at the same time the percentages do not have to sum up to hundred
percent. Soft resistance by ‘compromising’ would be exercised by 41% of the
respondents, while only a minority of spouses would try to hold their ground (strong
resistance) by using ‘forcing’ (10%). This share is even smaller than the percentage of
respondents that would avoid a confrontation and do nothing to solve the conflict
(‘avoiding’).
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Table 4: Conflict-handling strategies used by the partner (in %)







When we take into account combinations of strategies we see that the use of ‘problem
solving’ plus ‘compromising’ is the most frequent combination (21%), followed by (solely)
‘problem solving (14%), ‘problem solving’ plus ‘accommodating’ (13%), and (solely)
‘accommodating’ (10%). In total, these four patterns of conflict handling ‘cover’ almost
60% of the existing combinations reported by the partners. And again, we see that
cooperative forms of conflict handling are dominating. This clearly indicates that the
majority of the partners have high concern for the wish of their employed partners to
work overtime.
6. Explaining differences in household governance
by household and job influences
The variation in household governance that we found for our sample confirms that
households differ considerably in the way they try to govern the boundaries between
paid and unpaid work. In this section, we explore to what degree job and household
characteristics can explain these differences in household governance.
5.1 Expected impacts of household and job characteristics
Basically, we expect that a high demand to regulate household activities (due to the
household situation) will increase the spouses’ need for governance practices, while
external constraints (due to the job) will restrict the opportunities for households to apply
governance practices. Accordingly, we can derive two basic hypotheses.
Firstly, the presence of household rules and higher resistance in situations of work-
household conflict can be interpreted as a reaction to a high demand to regulate
household activities (regulation demands), given by the household situation (e.g.
presence of children or dual-earner ship). Thus, we expect that they will increase the
need to regulate household time allocation by institutionalized agreements and lead to
higher resistance of the spouse towards unexpected employer demands.
Hypothesis 1.1: The higher the demand in the household to regulate activities of
paid and unpaid work, the more the household will use informal household rules.
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Hypothesis 1.2: The higher the demand in the household to regulate activities of
paid and unpaid work, the more the spouse will resist high employer demands
(imposed on the employee) in situations of work-household conflict.
Secondly, the household environment (first of all the job) can establish restrictions (e.g.
unpredictable work schedules), which complicate the use of household rules and make it
difficult for an employee to refuse high employer demands. The stronger these
restrictions, the more difficult it is for the spouses to regulate household time allocation
by informal rules and the less it will be possible to resist towards high employer
demands.
Hypothesis 2.1: The more limited the opportunities of the household to regulate
activities of paid and unpaid work (due to job restrictions), the less the household
will use informal household rules.
Hypothesis 2.2: The more limited the opportunities of the household to regulate
activities of paid and unpaid work (due to job restrictions), the less the spouse
will resist high employer demands (imposed on the employee) in situations of
work-household conflict.
In order to test these hypotheses, we focus on a number of key household and job
characteristics that are likely to increase the regulation demands respectively restrict the
regulation opportunities in the household.
High regulation demands due to the household situation
Regulation demands emerge from the composition and circumstances of the household.
Two factors will play a major role as a determinant of household governance: the earner
profile of the household and further household characteristics like the presence of
children or the duration of the relationship. With regard to the earner type we distinguish
four different earner types according to the contractual hours of the spouses:
breadwinner households (15%), one-and-a-half earners (54%), dual-earners (22%), and
half-and-half earners (9%). The boundaries between these types are: 33 hours per week
(or more) for a fulltime position, less than 33 and more than 7 hours per week for a part-
time position, and 7 hours or less for ‘not working’. The category of the one-and-a-half
earners was split up in one-and-a-half earners (I) with the employee working fulltime and
the partner working part-time (31%), and one-and-a-half earners (II) with the partner
working fulltime and the employee working part-time (23%). Moreover we controlled for
sex and the highest educational degree of the employee.
As mentioned above, the choice for a particular earner model can be interpreted
as a fundamental agreement about the division of paid and unpaid work in the
household. This choice is of great importance for the regulation demands in the
household. While the breadwinner model is already representing a clear agreement on
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the division of paid and unpaid work in the household, the responsibilities and priorities
are less clear in households with two working partners. Furthermore, these households
have to cope with competing demands from two jobs and will therefore face a higher
demand to prevent conflicts and to govern the daily distribution of tasks by additional
agreements. Thus, we expect that households with two working partners will (a) employ
more agreements (time claims) and fixed moments (routines) for domestic activities, and
(b) use stricter conflict-handling strategies (higher control).
Furthermore, we expect that the regulation demands in the household will depend on the
following three household characteristics:
• The presence of children: Childcare is time intensive and requires a high degree of
reliability. As a consequence, we would expect that households with children will
have more rules and use stricter conflict-handling strategies.
• The duration of living together in a household: It takes time to figure out an efficient
way of governing the daily distribution of tasks in the household. As a consequence,
we expect that spouses, who are sharing a household for a long time, will have more
household rules at their disposal and will to a lower extent make use of stricter
conflict-handling strategies.
• Expectation of sharing a household in the future: When the spouses have
established their relationship by marriage they are more secure about a joint future.
Thus, they will be more willing to institutionalize their daily activities by household
rules. In order to maintain a good relationship in the future they will be more willing to
solve conflicts by cooperative conflict-handling strategies.
The analysis takes into account possible interaction effects. Because regulation
demands are in general higher in households where both partners are working we
expect that the mentioned three household characteristics will have a higher impact than
in breadwinner households (interaction effect). Furthermore, we control for sex and the
highest educational degree of the employee.
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Restricted regulation opportunities due to job constraints
The type of job that one or both partners are doing forms an important constraint for the
household. The following three job characteristics will be a constraint for the use of
household rules and stricter (higher control) conflict-handling strategies: high demand for
overtime, irregular working hours, low time autonomy6.
A job that has one or more of these characteristics will make it more difficult for
the spouses to stick to agreements on domestic activities. As a consequence, we expect
that such households will have less household rules and apply a more flexible modus of
time allocation. For the use of conflict-handling strategies we would expect a twofold
pattern. The more demanding the job of the employee the more difficult it is to stick to
agreements with the spouse. As a consequence, we expect that the spouse will be less
inclined to use strict strategies. If the spouse has a demanding job it is more difficult to
compensate deviating behavior of the employee. Thus, we expect that the partner will to
a lower extent resist in work-household conflicts.
Here again, we expect that the mentioned job characteristics have a higher effect
on households where both partners are working. These households are assumed to face
a general higher level of regulation demands. As a consequence, restrictive job
characteristics will be decisive for the opportunities to cope with these demands by using
household rules and resisting towards unexpected employer demands (interaction
effect).
5.2 Analysis: effects of household and job characteristics
Analyzing variation in household rules
In order to evaluate to what extent the presence of household rules is influenced by job
and household characteristics we summarized the use of agreements (time claims) and
fixed moments for domestic activities in one construct for the presence of household
rules. This new variable consists of eight items and has an alpha of 0,65. A separate
factor analysis confirms that this variable provides a good measurement for the
presence of rules in the household. By means of a linear regression analysis we
investigated in which way the presence of household rules is related to household and
job characteristics. According to our expectations, the choice for a particular earner
model plays a crucial role for the control demands in the household. Therefore, we are
not only looking at main effects of the selected household and job characteristics, but
also investigating their effects for the five different earner types (interaction effects).
Since we have to cope with a rather large number of interaction effects we will only
report significant interactions (see appendix: table 5). Interaction effects that are not
                                                          
6 High job demands are measured on a five-point-scale by the frequency of overwork by
colleagues in a similar function. ‘How often does it happen that colleagues in similar
functions in your department work overtime on evenings and in the weekend?’ Irregular
working hours are measured by the question: ‘Do your workdays usually end on the
same time?’ Working time autonomy was measured on a five-point scale by the following
question: ‘Who determines mostly the begin- and end times of your work: Is it you or
someone else?’
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contained in the tables are not significant.
The linear regression analysis shows (see appendix: table 5, column 1) that only
ten percent of the variance is explained by the selected household and job
characteristics (plus control variables for sex and education). However, the F values
confirm that the model fits the structure of the data and a number of the expected effects
are significant.
Surprisingly, the earner type of the household has no direct influence on the
presence of household rules. This result (partly) does not support hypothesis 1.1
respectively does not confirm a positive relationship between high regulation demands
and a high presence of household rules. Apparently, the use of agreements and fixed
moments for domestic activities does not depend on the earner model of the household
and the resulting regulation demands. Neither is there a significant direct effect of
children, marital status, and the duration of the household. Household circumstances
and the resulting control demands do not have an effect on the use of household rules.
In this respect, the presence of household rules seems to be more a question of different
household styles, preferences, and skills than a result of high control demands due to
household circumstances. That personal characteristics matter here is also indicated by
the fact that higher educated employees are to higher extent reporting to have rules in
the household.
Several job characteristics have a significant impact on the presence of
household rules. When the employee has a job with irregular daily working hours it
becomes more difficult for the partners to apply household rules. This partly supports
hypothesis 2.1 respectively confirms a positive relationship between good regulation
opportunities and a higher presence of household rules. The effects of a high demand
for overtime and high working time autonomy differ with the earner type of the household
(interaction effect). Compared to breadwinner households, households with two working
partners use more household rules when the job demands a lot of overtime. In contrast
to households where both partners are working, breadwinner households already have a
clear and simple agreement about the division of paid and unpaid work in the household.
As a consequence, they need fewer rules when the job of the employee demands a lot
of overtime. In households where the partners have to cope with competing demands
from two jobs, a high demand for overtime is increasing the need to regulate daily time
allocation by further rules.
While breadwinner households use more household rules when the employee
has a high degree of time autonomy, households with two working partners just do the
opposite and use fewer rules. Apparently, breadwinner households are more likely to
use their time autonomy for regulating daily activities by routines and fixed agreements.
In households with two working partners, where control demands are in general higher,
time autonomy seems to ease the combination of paid and unpaid work. Consequently,
the partners use fewer rules and choose for a more flexible modus of decision making.
Summing up, hypothesis 2 is clearly confirmed by our data.
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Analyzing variations in conflict handling
The analysis shows (see appendix: table 5, columns 2-6) that all selected household
characteristics and a number of job characteristics have significant effects on the conflict
handling pattern of the partner.
The use of conflict-handling strategies by the partner is clearly affected by the
duration of the household. ‘Young’ households are to a higher extent facing a demand to
cope with conflicts (more ‘problem solving’, less ‘avoiding’) and resist to unexpected
employer demands (‘compromising’ and ‘forcing). This pattern is in line with our
expectations.
When both spouses are working, the partner is to a lower extent
‘accommodating’ than partners in breadwinner households. Competing demands of two
jobs are apparently reducing the willingness to make concessions in work-household
conflicts. This confirms our expectations, although we do not find any significant positive
effects for a higher level of resistance towards unexpected employer demands (like
‘compromising’ or ‘forcing’). Furthermore there are no significant differences among
households with two working partners.
The partner is to a lower extent ‘accommodating’ in work-household conflict when
children are present in the household. As expected, children are increasing the control
demands in the household and reduce the willingness of the partner to comply with
unexpected employer demands. Contrary to our expectations, the combination of two
jobs and children (interaction effect) does not lead to higher control demands and the
use of stricter conflict-handling strategies.
Married partners are to a higher degree reacting to high work demands by
‘problem solving’. This relationship is particularly strong for breadwinner households
(interaction effect). Again we find our expectation confirmed that partners who expect
their relationship to endure have a higher interest to solve conflicts in a way that does
not harm their relationship (‘problem solving’). Married partners in breadwinner
households have a stronger interest to find such a solution than married partners in
other households. This is surprising at first glance but probably resulting from the fact
that married couples in the breadwinner model represent the traditional way of sharing a
household where a lifelong relationship forms an important element. Summing up, there
is quite some support for hypothesis 1.2 respectively for a positive relationship between
high regulation demands on the one hand and more resistance of the partner towards
unexpected work demands on the other.
Among the selected job characteristics we only find an effect for irregular working
hours. Thus, hypothesis 2.2 on the positive relationship between restricted regulation
opportunities on the one hand and less (room for) resistance of the spouse on the other
is only partly confirmed by our data. When the employee works irregular hours, the
partner’s resistance towards unexpected employer demands (overtime) is smaller. In line
with our expectations, a job with irregular hours constrains the opportunities of the
household to avert unexpected employer demands (less ‘compromising’).
Furthermore, we find a strong influence of the spouse’s sex. Male partners are
more willing to make concessions to the wish of their employed wife to work overtime
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(‘accommodating’), than do female partners with their employed male partner.
Compared to women they exercise soft control by ‘compromising’ and are rather trying
to avoid a conflict. In order to assess whether this difference is caused by the particular
conflict issue – having dinner together – we also looked at the conflict-handling patterns
of the employees. According to the situation sketched in the vignette, they are striving for
overtime (while the partner wants to have dinner together). But again we found that male
employees are more willing to avoid a confrontation and to make concessions to the
wish of their wives to have dinner together, while female employees are to a higher
extent claiming some concessions from their husbands (‘compromising’).
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6. Conclusions and discussion
This article introduced the concept of household governance and investigated empirical
differences in the way cohabiting partners are combining the demands of paid and
unpaid work. Our approach emphasizes informal household rules and conflict-handling
strategies as important means of households to ‘govern’ daily time allocation.
The analysis of a sample of 809 Dutch cohabiting couples showed considerable
variation in the way households attempt to govern the boundaries between paid and
unpaid work. The empirical results warrant the conclusion that research on time
allocation, labor supply and work-life balance has to gain a lot from paying closer
attention to the determinants and consequences of governance practices in the
household. It is quite evident that different governance practices of households have an
impact on the availability and flexibility of employees for demands of paid and unpaid
work. A considerable number of employees is confronted with rules for the daily time
allocation in the household in terms of agreements and fixed times for the performance
of domestic activities. Likewise, many of them also have to face strict conflict-handling
strategies which their partners use to prevent or sanction deviations from these rules.
Although the analysis showed that cooperative strategies prevail in our sample, a
significant number of spouses actively resist unexpected employer demands (overtime).
By taking into account differences in these governance practices we might thus identity
important additional restrictions, which moderate - support or constraint – impacts of
organizational control or institutional regulations on the labor supply of employees.
Moreover, the data show that the type of household governance is shaped by a
number of household and job characteristics. Originally, we expected that the earner
type of the household (dual-earner ship) and other household characteristics (like the
presence of children) would increase the household’s demand to regulate household
activities by informal rules and increase the partner’s resistance in situations of work-
household conflict. For the impact of job characteristics we expected that restrictive job
circumstances of employees (like a high demand for overtime) would complicate the use
of informal rules in the household and reduce the partner’s resistance in situations in
work-household conflict. Our analysis shows that this basic model is in some respects
too simple. It turned out that the impact of household and job characteristics on
governance practices of households is of a more complex nature. Based on our analysis
we can draw four main conclusions:
1. The household and job situation does not account for much of the variation in
governance practices of households.
Whether spouses attempt to regulate household activities by informal rules and whether
they resists unexpected employer demands (overtime) is only to a limited extent
influenced by the given household and job situation. The selected household and job
characteristics do not explain much of the total variation in informal household rules and
the conflict behavior (resistance) of the partner. Thus, there might be evidence that the
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spouses’ choice of governance practices in the household is rather influenced by
individual dispositions, preferences or capabilities (e.g. educational degree) than by
household and job circumstances. If this holds true, varying governance practices of
households constitute a rather independent factor that could account for variations in
time allocation patterns of employees independently from the given household and job
context. However, though the explained variance is low, we do find empirical evidence
for influences of household and job characteristics.
2. Differences in household governance do not simply depend on the household
situation or the job situation but on the interplay of the household and job situation.
The selected household characteristics do not have a direct impact on the presence of
informal rules in the household. Neither do they account for much of the given variation
in conflict handling: only when the partners have children or when they are not yet living
together for a long time, the partner’s resistance towards unexpected employer demands
(overtime) is stronger. Yet, whether or not spouses react to unfavorable job
circumstances by strong regulation of household activities (informal rules) strongly
depends on their earner model. When both spouses are working, regulation demands in
the household are in general higher. A job with a high demand for overtime is making the
combination of paid and unpaid work even more difficult in these households. As a
consequence (and in contrast to breadwinner households), spouses in two-earner
households increase the regulation of household activities by informal rules.
A high degree of time autonomy on the other hand helps to cope with demands from
two jobs and makes household rules less important. In breadwinner households, where
the distribution of responsibilities for paid and unpaid work is rather simple and clear,
restrictive job circumstances do not increase the need for more household rules. Nor do
these households refrain from household rules when they have a high degree of time
autonomy.
3. Job constraints are not only a restriction to governance practices in the household;
they also increase the need for stronger regulation of household activities by informal
rules.
The interplay of household and job characteristics that we found for our sample also
changes our view on the role and impacts of job constraints. Originally, we expected that
job characteristics of the spouses will constitute important constraints for the use of rules
and conflict-handling strategies in the household (regulation opportunities). This was
only confirmed for irregular working hours. Irregular working hours restrict the use of
household rules and make it less likely that the partner resists to unexpected employer
demands (overtime). A low degree of time autonomy and a high demand for overtime do
not have such a restrictive effect. In two-earner households, where regulation demands
are in general higher, a high demand for overtime is even increasing the need to
regulate household activities by informal rules. These households react to high employer
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demands with a higher degree of regulation. Same holds for a low degree of time
autonomy. When time autonomy is low, two-earner households use more informal rules
for the distribution of household activities; when time autonomy is high, they tend to
refrain from household rules and choose a more flexible modus of distributing activities
in the household.
4. Considerable gender differences in conflict-handling: Stronger resistance of female
employees in work-household conflicts; more accommodating and avoiding of male
employees.
The conflict behavior in the household strongly depends on the sex of the spouse. Male
spouses are more likely to accept the wish of their employed wives to work overtime and
to avoid a confrontation. Female spouses are to a higher extent claiming concessions
from their employed husbands. This calls for an explanation. Since we know that women
usually spend considerably more time on unpaid work and less time on paid work, they
might be more sensitive to attempts of their husbands to strengthen this unequal division
of work in the household. Furthermore, our data show that men deviate more often from
agreements over domestic activities. In this respect, the conflict behavior of female
partners might also be a reaction to frequent rule deviations of their employed husbands.
Apparently, men are quite aware of this fact, too. On the one hand, they are not willing to
intensify the unequal division of work in the household and concede in situations of
work-household conflict. On the other hand, men handle work-household conflicts to a
higher extent by avoidance strategies. We know from existing negotiation research that
avoidance strategies can be powerful means to defend the status quo of the unequal
division of work in the household (Kluwer, 1998). In this respect, avoidance strategies
used by the husbands might be an important restriction to a more equal division of work
in the household.
Summing up, there is quite some evidence that household governance is a useful
concept to investigate and explain differences in the way households combine paid and
unpaid work. A fruitful next step in a research program on household governance would
be to model to what extent variations in household governance affect time allocation
patterns of employees. In this context the interaction of household governance with the
job and household demands of spouses might offer a new explanation for variation in
time-allocation patterns and perceived feelings of stress and time famine. It would at the
same time raise the question whether and under what conditions governance practices
in the household help spouses to realize their time preferences and when and under
what conditions they rather constitute additional constraints and become a source for
stress and time famine.
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Table 5: Linear regression analysis: effects of household and job characteristics on the use of household rules and conflict-handling strategies
Household rules Accommodating Problem solving Compromising Avoiding Forcing
Earner typea
Dual earners 0,204
-0,258* 0,048 0,037 -0,034 0,096
One-and-a-half earners I (employee fulltime) 0,190 -0,271 0,166 0,048 -0,078 0,058
One-and-a-half-earners II (partner fulltime) -0,014 -0,218 0,139 -0,028 -0,075 0,060
Half-and-half earners 0,211 -0,215 0,153 0,016 -0,080 0,075
Household characteristics
Children 0,017
-0,216* 0,027 0,034 0,028 0,025
Duration of the household 0,011 -0,021
-0,121** -0,107* 0,108* -0,118**
Married 0,027 -0,113 0,445** 0,018 -0,053 0,006
Personal characteristics
Sex employee (female)b 0,019 0,267** -0,091 -0,189** 0,154** -0,141**
Educational degree employee 0,126** 0,038 0,028 -0,039 -0,062 -0,031
Job characteristics
High demand for overtime (employee)
-0,228** 0,032 0,038 0,040 0,003 -0,005
High demand for overtime (partner) 0,013 0,053 -0,030 -0,043 -0,034 -0,043
Irregular working hours (employee)
-0,193** 0,057 -0,249** -0,097** -0,032 -0,063
Irregular working hours (partner) 0,015 -0,038 -0,035 0,001 -0,004 0,021
High influence on working times (employee) 0,286** -0,002 -0,011 0,012 0,018 -0,009
High influence on working times (partner) 0,090* 0,053 0,037 0,003 -0,003 -0,033
Interaction: earner type * high demand for overtime (employee)
Dual earners * high demand for overtime (employee) 0,053 . . . . .
One-and-a-half earners I * high demand for overtime (employee) 0,201 . . . . .
One-and-a-half earners II * high demand for overtime (employee) 0,258* . . . . .
Half-and-half earners * high demand for overtime (employee) 0,237* . . . . .
Interaction: earner type * high influence on working times (employee)
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Dual earners * high influence on working times (employee)
-0,308* . . . . .
One-and-a-half earners I * high influence on working times
(employee)
-.0,399** . . . . .
One-and-a-half earners II * high influence on working times
(employee)
-0,160 . . . . .
Half-and-half earners * high influence on working times (employee)
-0,350** . . . . .
Interaction: earner type * children
Dual earners * children . 0,145* . . . .
One-and-a-half earners I * children . 0,210 . . . .
One-and-a-half earners II * children . 0,135 . . . .
Half-and-half earners * children . 0,045 . . . .
Interaction: earner type * married
Dual earners * married . 0,010
-0,204* . . .
One-and-a-half earners I * married . 0,106
-0,391** . . .
One-and-a-half earners II * married . 0,094
-0,371** . . .
Half-and-half earners * married . 0,191* -0,280** . . .
Interaction: earner type * irregular working hours (employee)
Dual earners * irregular working hours (employee) . . 0,284* . . .
One-and-a-half earners I * irregular working hours (employee) . . 0,270* . . .
One-and-a-half earners II * irregular working hours (employee) . . 0,204* . . .
Half-and-half earners * irregular working hours (employee) . . 0,107 . . .
Adjusted R2 0,100 0,067 0,030 0,056 0,026 0,024
F 4,787** 3,325** 2,014** 3,938** 2,332** 2,208**
n 786 744 746 745 741 746
a
 Reference category: one earner household (breadwinner).
b
 The partner is male, with the exception of 24 gay couples.
*
 p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01.
Source: Time Competition Survey, 2003.
